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ABSTRACT
Standards setting organizations are formed to promulgate industry
standards and in turn manage the course of technology that falls
within their particular niche. Industry standards are the cornerstone
of the technological compatibility that we enjoy as an advanced
society. As we delve into the 21st century and beyond, the role of
integrity in the standards setting process as a whole must be
recognized by standards groups, end-users and importantly by the
courts. This comment seeks to draw these entities into focusing on
integrity and understand its importance in standards setting.
Finally, this article strives to present a good starting point for the
court, that is, a recent decision in Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Tech where
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit failed to fully
understand the role of integrity in the standards setting process.
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INTRODUCTION

Industry standards are promulgated to promote technological advancement and
user convenience, but can they give potential patentees an inside track to fortune?
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Rambus Inc. v. InfTneon Tech.
moved toward that end by allowing an exmember of a standards setting organization
to gain inside information and subsequently patent technology encompassed in a
forthcoming standard.' Future decisions relying upon this authority may undermine

the

policy

behind

setting

standards

by

discouraging

industry

leaders

from

participating in standards committees entirely.
Industry standards play a decisive role in advancing technology and providing
end user convenience; they are the cornerstone of the plug-n-play interchangeability
of the products enjoyed by a technological society.2 Standards are formed under two
methods, de facto and de jure.'
De facto standards are created through the

* Juris Doctor Candidate, January 2005, The John Marshall Law School. Bachelor of Science Environmental Sciences, DePaul University, Chicago Illinois, 1996. The author would like to
dedicate this writing to his grandfather Adam Dorth, who unknowingly taught him the most
important lesson: A risk combined with fervent dedication yields success. The author would also like
to thank his wife Kari for her unwavering support during this law school experiment.
IRambus Inc. v. Infineon Tech., 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003). On January 29th the Appellate
Court for the Federal Circuit overturned the district court ruling which appeared on its face to be an
easy decision; the Appellate Division has created a visible wave in the intellectual property world, as
this paper will strive to illustrate - this wave has the potential to change the course of technology.
See also Richard A. Posner, "The Law & Economics of Intellectual Property," at
http://www.DAEDALUS.amacad.org/issues/spring2002/posner.pdf
(last visited March 5, 2003)
("Legal disputes over intellectual property have exploded in recent years. No field of law is in
greater ferment. And in no field of law have judges and scholars experienced more difficulty
recently in getting their bearings. The increase in intellectual property litigation was made
inevitable by the rise of the information economy, an economy built on intellectual property- which
is now, incidentally, America's largest export."). Id.
2 See Plug and Play On the Web HghSpeed InternetAccess Via Electrical Outlets Is On the
Horizon, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 2003, at 48, available at 2003 WL 13239226 (providing an interesting
discussion on the next step to internet access in a plug and play world- access through the
ubiquitous electrical outlet.) Id. Driven by a plug and play goal, this new method of receiving high
speed internet access thorough an ultra-convenient, low profile method has the blessings of federal
regulators and may pose the next step in internet evolution, potentially showing broadband, which
is the current high speed access leader, the road to extinction. See also Howard Elmer, What's New
in Minivans, SUP's and Trucks, THE TORONTO STAR, Feb. 19, 2003, available at 2003 WL 12873959
at *4 (indicating that the trend in new cars and trucks is compatibility of after-market, plug-n-play
components which snap on to rail systems and other areas of automobiles giving the vehicle a
unique feature system custom to the end-user's needs).
3 Janice M. Mueller, PatentMisuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 623, 633 (2002) (detailing the capture of industry standards, including discussion on the
rise of standards and their effect on intellectual property rights as well as a brief discussion on the
Rambus district court decision). Patents are indeed compatible with industry standards, but that
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momentum of an emerging market.4 For instance, the software juggernaut Microsoft
Corporation and their flagship product Windows was not intentionally set as the
computing platform standard by a Standards Setting Organization (SSO). Rather, as
the software and computing industry developed, various manufacturers who strived
to enhance the marketability of their products chose the industry leading Microsoft
Windows platform. As a result, Windows has evolved into the de facto industry
standard for the computer applications market and is used by virtually all computer
manufacturers.
De jure standards are crafted through the efforts of SSO's.'
SSO's are
specialized organizations with open memberships comprised of industry professionals
(often business competitors), scholars and engineers who strive to manage the course
of development through effective planning.6 These groups set standards according to
future market trends generally to "enhance the global competitiveness of U.S.
business and the American quality of life by promoting and facilitating voluntary
consensus standards and ensuring their integrity. '7 A recently established SSO is
the Homeland Securities Standards Panel the sole focus of which is the development
of security standards for both public and private sectors to increase the United
States' preparedness to combat terrorism within its borders.8
This commentary specifically focuses on de jure standards in the computer
processor manufacturing industry -a juncture of intellectual property law and SSO's.
Part I provides general information regarding SSO patent disclosure requirements. It
SSO participants must be held to a high standard regarding the disclosure of pending patents and
patents which may be encompassed in forthcoming standards. Id Further, in the case of
intentional misuse of SSO participation, the courts should refuse to enforce the patent altogether.
Id. Mueller concludes that "the key inquiry should be whether the patentee disclosed the existence
of its patent or patent application to the standards setting body while that body had an opportunity
to select an alternative, nonproprietary standard." Id. This contention is very much like that of
JEDEC member Gordon Kelley, detailed in note 55 infra.
4 Id. at 631 (describing the ideal setting for de facto standards as a market which is
characterized by externalities; in these markets the value that the consumer places on a good
increases as more consumers use that good. Accordingly, firms strive to position their technology as
the technological standard in that market).
Id. (pointing to a well known de jure standard as the American National Standard Code for
Information Interchange (ASCII), which is the basic code used universally in computer software
allowing software and hardware to communicate).
I-d.
7 See The American National Standards Institute, About, at http://www.ansi.org/about-ansi
/overview/overview.aspx?menuid=1 (last visited June 14, 2003). ANSI itself does not develop
standards, it provides all interested U.S. parties with a neutral venue to come together and work
towards common agreements. Id. Further, the group is a private, non-profit organization that
administers and coordinates the U.S. voluntary standardization and conformity assessment system.
Id.
8 Overview of the American National Standards Institute, at http://www.ansi.org/standards
-activities/standards boardsjpanels/hssp/overview.aspx?menuid=3 (last visited June 14, 2003).
Established by ANSI in February 2003, the proposed mission of the Homeland
Securities Panel (HLSP) is to catalog, promote, accelerate and coordinate the
timely development of consensus standards within the national and international
voluntary standards system intended to meet identified Homeland Security needs,
and communicate the existence of such standards appropriately to governmental
units and the private sector.
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discusses cases that illustrate the severity of violating such requirements as well as
the need for concise policies courts can accurately interpret. Part 11 analyzes the
decision and repercussions of Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Tech.,9 a highly debated case
in which the court recently gave an advantage to a party ostensibly in violation of a
patent disclosure policy. Finally, Part III sets forth numerous considerations which
will aid in sculpting the solutions to the problematic issues that will arise in the
wake of the Rambus case; primarily the implementation of stringent intellectual
property policies for SSO's and strict enforcement through contract and tort law
principles.

I. BACKGROUND
This section provides an overview of the Joint Electron Device Engineering
Council, Solid State Technology Association (JEDEC) as well as Infineon
Technologies, a current JEDEC member and Rambus Incorporated, a former JEDEC
member.'0 Further, it will provide information surrounding the developments which
fueled a lawsuit between these parties and the subsequent decision by the Federal
Circuit which was set forth on January 29, 2003."

A. JEDECSolid State Technology Association
JEDEC is an SSO that was established in 1960 and focuses primarily on setting
standards in the electronics industry, most of its activity being in the computer
hardware sector.2 The JEDEC subcommittee of interest is JC-42.3, which met to
draft standards for random access memory (RAM).' 3 RAM is a data storage chip
manufactured from semiconductor integrated circuits frequently used in computers

318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
10

See

Joint

Electronic

Device

Engineering

Council,

Members-hip

List,

at

http://www.jedec.org/service members/New Members/memberco.cfm (last visited June 14, 2003)
(explaining that members include: Apple Computer Incorporated, Cisco Systems, Compaq Computer
Corporation, Dell Computer, Fujitsu, Hewlett Packard Company, IBM Corporation, Intel
Corporation, Microelectronics, Nokia Research Center, Northrup Grumman, Sun Microsystems
Incorporated, Siemens, Sanyo Semiconductor, Toshiba America, Texas Instruments, and hundreds
of other industry players).
11Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1081.
12 Joint Electronic Device Engineering Council, About JEDEC, at http://www.jedec.org/home
/about-jedec.cfm (last visited June 14, 2003).
JEDEC was originally created in 1960 as a joint activity between EIA an NEMA,
to cover the standardization of discrete semiconductor devices and later expanded
in 1970 to include integrated circuits. JEDEC does its work through its 48
committees/subcommittees that are overseen by the JEDEC Board of Directors.
Presently there are about 300 member companies in JEDEC including both
manufacturers and users of semiconductor components and others allied to the
field.
Id.
13 Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1085.
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and other digital devices.' 4 The committee efforts at issue are JC-42.3's efforts to
incorporate new technologies into its Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
(SDRAM) standard, and its predecessor standard discussed in section 11.15 SDRAM is
a specialized form of RAM, a type of semiconductor which stores data during
computing processes. 16 The SDRAM standard adopted in early
1993 is a commonly
7
used chip technology because of its high density and low price.

B. Ramb us Incorporated
Rambus Incorporated provides chip-to-chip interface products, its primary
function is the development and licensing of technologies to memory chip
manufacturers. 8 Rambus' efforts focus mainly on producing intellectual property in
the high bandwidth niche; these efforts have resulted in over 100 United States and
foreign patents.' 9
Rambus has licensed technology to approximately thirty
semiconductor manufacturers worldwide.20
Rambus joined JEDEC committee JC-42.3 in February of 1992.21 During tenure
with the committee its primary function was to help develop the SDRAM standard.22
Rambus officially terminated membership with JEDEC in June of 1996.23 In
December of that year, JEDEC committee JC-42.3 began officially working on a new
project, the DDR-SDRAM standard.2 4 The DDR-SDRAM standard was to encompass

1'See Free On Line Dictionary Of Computing, at http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/ (last visited
June 14, 2003)[hereinafter "FOLDOC"]. FOLDOC is a good online encyclopedia of computing and
hardware needs in layman terms and further defines DRAM/SDRAM as the most common form of
RAM in use today. RAM is built from semiconductor integrated circuits, which can be either static
(SRAM) or dynamic (DRAM). Id. As this comment indicates, the SDRAM and DRAM are the
technologies that fueled the dispute between Rambus and Infineon.
15
lRambus, 318 F.3d at 1096.
16 See FOLDC, supra note 14, at http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2003)
(SDRAM is called "static" because it will retain a value as long as power is supplied, unlike dynamic
random access memory (DRAM) which must be regularly refreshed. Id. It is, however, still volatile,
i.e. it will lose its contents when the power is switched off, in contrast to ROM. Id. SRAM is usually
faster than DRAM but since each bit requires several transistors (about six) you can get less bits of
SRAM in the same area. Id. It usually costs more per bit than DRAM and so is used for the most
speed-critical parts of a computer (e.g., cache memory or other circuit). Id.
17Id.
18 See Rambus website, at http://www.rambus.com/about/ (last visited June 14, 2003). Rambus
also provides services such as Infrastructure Development, Design and Support Services, and
Market Development, "to help ensure the successful implementation of our solutions from chip
design to system integration through volume production." Id
1' Richard M. McDermott & Henery B. Ward, III, Selected Intellectual Property Law
Developments, ELEC. BANKING L. & COM. REP. 24, (May 2001), availableat 6 No. 1 GLEBLCR 24,
(presenting an interesting perspective of the state of being in the industry just after the District
Court held in favor of Infineon).
20

Jd

21 Rambus

Inc. v. Infineon Tech., 318 F.3d 1081, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

2'2
Jd

2:3Id.
24 Id.at 1108.
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four new technologies that had been discussed prior to Rambus leaving the SSO.25
Rambus continued to follow the developments of the JEDEC DDR-SDRAM standard
through information sent via an inside informant known as "secret squirrel" from
within the committee.26 As a result, Rambus was able to modify its patent
applications to encompass the developing DDR-SDRAM standard.
The DDRSDRAM standard was adopted by JEDEC in 2000 and contained the technology that
Rambus had patented.2 8

C.Infineon Incorporated
Infineon Incorporated, a German based firm, is a former division of Siemens
AG.2 9 One of Infineon's four business units specializes in manufacturing RAM chips.30
Pursuant to development of its DDR-SDRAM technology, Infineon designed memory
in compliance with the JEDEC standard, the same standard which encompassed
patented technology vis-A-vis Rambus. 3' Infineon, along with industry leaders
Hyundai and Micron, refused to pay royalties to Rambus, which was demanding a
steep 3.5 percent rate.32

25

Id.at 1085. The technologies to be included were CAS latency, programmable burst length,

externally supplied reference voltage, and two-blank designs. Id.
26 Richard H. Stern, Rambus v. Infineon: The Superior Aptness Of Common-Law Remedies
Than Antitrust ForStandardizationSkullduggery, 23 EUR. INTELL. L. REV. 495, 497 (2001) Multiple

emails between Rambus and informant "secret squirrel" were transmitted after Rambus left
JEDEC. Id. However, since other evidence was so compelling, and despite the media publicity
"secret squirrel" received, the court chose to rely on the evidence showing that Rambus began to
change its claims to fit evolving SDRAM standards. Id. Stern describes Rambus' argument as "no
more than semantic fancy footwork" that the court considered mere subterfuge. Id.
27 Id. at 498 (stating that the court found Rambus' failure to disclose its patents the most
material element of its decision).
28 Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Tech., 318 F.3d 1081, 1085-86 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The inventions
involved were U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 7,510,898 and U.S. Patents Nos. 5,953,263,
6,034,918 and 6,032,214. Id.
29 See Infinion Inc., Company Information, at http://www.infineon.com/ (last visited June 14,
2003).
Infineon is a leading innovator in the international semiconductor industry. It
designs, develops, manufactures and markets a broad range of semiconductors
and complete system solutions targeted at selected industries. Products which
serve applications in the wireless and wireline communications, automotive,
industrial, computer, security and chip card markets.
Its product portfolio
consists of both memory and logic products and includes digital, mixed-signal and
analogue integrated circuits, or IC's, as well as discrete semiconductor products
and system solutions.

Id.
'30Id.It is this business unit that had licensing agreements with Rambus, licenses which were
not honored by Infineon and fueled the court dispute.
'31Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1086.
32 Stern, supra note 26, at 495.
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D. PatentDisclosure Policiesand StandardSetting Organizations.
In a 2002 study performed at the University of California, Berkeley, it was found
that a majority of SSO's have intellectual property rights policies.33 That research
shows that sixty-seven percent of the study group have polices which require either
an express or implied obligation requiring members to disclose any intellectual
property rights they may hold pertinent to any forthcoming standard.34 The JEDEC
Patent Policy states in part:
Committees should ensure that no program of standardization shall refer to
a product on which there is a known patent unless all the relevant technical
information covered by the patent is known.
The chairperson . . . must . . . call attention to the obligation of all
participants to inform the meeting of any knowledge they may have of any
patents, or pending patents, that might be involved in the work they are
undertaking ... patentees or applicants must agree to license others to use
the patent ... at reasonable terms."3 5 (emphasis added)
JEDEC members are made aware of the policy through three means: first, the
policy is discussed orally during each session, second, it is presented through
viewgraphs at each meeting,3 6and lastly, the session minutes contain an attachment
including the JEDEC policy.

E. Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Tech.
Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Tech. illustrates the magnitude of SSO members'
responsibility regarding adherence to the patent disclosure policies of those
33 Mark A. Lemley, Intollectual PropertyRights and Standard-Setting Organizations,90 CAL.
L. REV. 1889, 1900-03 (2002). Lemley conducted a survey of the rules and bylaws of forty-three
different SSO's in the telecommunications and computer-networking industries. Id. The study was
based on three criteria: 1) a determination whether the SSO required disclosure, 2) the effect of the
disclosure on the forthcoming standard and 3) whether the SSO imposed a licensing requirement on
intellectual property owner-members. Id. Further, Lemley concludes that what is most striking
about the resulting data is "the significant variation in policies among the different SSO's." Id. at
1904. Lemley found that of the forty-three groups surveyed, thirty-six had written policies
governing the ownership of intellectual property rights, four had no policy at all, two had statements
on the organization website about intellectual property rights but no official policy had been
adopted, and one had no policy at all. Id. Finally, most of the SSO's without any policy were small
organizations, whereas the more developed organizations had better developed policies. Id.
34 Id.
at 1903. The majority of SSO's that had a policy (twenty-four of thirty-six) imposed either
an express or implied obligation that members disclose intellectual property rights of which they are
aware. Id. Those SSO's that did not require disclosure generally imposed other conditions that
obviated the need for disclosure. Id. For example, some SSO's required royalty-free licensing of all
member intellectual property rights that cover a group standard, whether or not they were disclosed
to the SSO. Id.
'3 Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1097.
36 Id. at 1098. With three regular means of conveyance, where all attending members were
made aware of the intellectual property policy, it follows that a member cannot claim in good faith
that they did not know of, or have access to the intellectual property policy of JEDEC.
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organizations. Rambus sued Infineon for patent infringement.3 7 In its complaint,
Rambus charged that Infineon had infringed two of its patents, specifically
technology that was encompassed in the DDR-SDRAM standard.38 In response,
Infineon counterclaimed alleging fraud by Rambus for using information obtained
through its role in the JEDEC counsel (further described in section 11).39
After the presentation of Rambus' case-in-chief, the court granted Infineon's
motion for a Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL). 4' The trial proceeded on the
counterclaim and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Infineon. 4' The Court
awarded Infineon over $7 million in attorney's fees and expenses under 35 U.S.C.A. §
285 which states in part: "One purpose of allowing attorney fees to prevailing party,
in a patent infringement case is to compensate the prevailing party because the
losing party's misconduct was so unfair and reckless as to make it unconscionable for
prevailing party to sustain expense of counsel. 42 Further, in calculating damages,
the court reasoned that Rambus' bad faith did not lie in its attempt to file additional
claims to cover competitor's products, but rather in the manner which it
accomplished this goal. Accordingly, the court reasoned that Rambus' undoing was a
result of its infiltration of JEDEC and the violation of the council's patent disclosure
43
policy.
The district court decision was overturned on appeal, which is the focus of the
following section.

II. ANALYSIS
On January 29, 2003, in a two to one split decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit overturned the jury verdict that found Rambus
fraudulently concealed information from JEDEC members and in turn reversed the
lower court's decision that granted Infineon attorney's fees."
Additionally, the
appellate division remanded the case with instructions that will potentially make it
easier for Rambus to pursue royalty claims against Infineon and others. 45 This

'37
Rambus

v. Infineon, 155 F. Supp. 668, 670 (E.D. VA. 2001).
Id. at 671.

'38

39 Id.

40Id. (finding that the remaining patents, 5,953,263; 6,032,214 and 6,034,918 were not
infringed). See also Communications Workers of America v. Ector County Hospital Dist., No. 2002
WL 31955935 (W.D. Tex. 2002) at *2. The issue in considering an initial motion for JMOL is
whether a question of fact remains for the jury to determine; no such issue remains if the facts and
inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the district court believes
that a reasonable person could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Id.
41 Rambus, 155 F. Supp. at 670.

42 Id.at 684.

43Id.at 677.

4 Id
45 Id. at 1106 (finding that the district court's grant of a JMOL of non-infringement by
Infineon was incorrect, the Appellate Division vacated the judgment and remanded the case with
instructions to reconsider the infringement claim, under the CAFC's interpretation which fits nicely
with Rambus' argument); see also,Ian Fried, Rambus Win May Mean $1 Billion In Revenue, CNET,
at http://news.com.com/2100-1001-242320.html (last visited March 24, 2003) Rambus could net more
than one billion dollars in 2003 as a result of the appellate court decision, and effectively, five years
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section will explore three areas where the appellate court may have failed in its
capacity: Section 1 addresses whether JEDEC members, like Rambus, have an
affirmative duty to disclose information to the SSO, Section II discusses what
information would fall under the duty to disclose, Section III focuses on the appellate
court decision overturning the fraud verdict against Rambus and Section IV analyzes
the public policy effects of the appellate court decision.

A. DidRambus Have A Duty to Disclose?
On appeal, Rambus argued that it was under no affirmative duty to inform the
JEDEC about pending patent applications and accordingly it was entitled to keep
such information private as trade secrets.46 In its interpretation of the JEDEC
Intellectual Property Rights Policy, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) found that the language does not impose any direct duty on members.47
Further, "no language in the membership application or manual excerpts expressly
require members to disclose information . . . [and there is] no indication that
members ever legally agreed to disclose information. '4 However, since the testimony
of JEDEC members indicated a common understanding that there is an affirmative
duty to disclose, the court suspended its interpretation in favor of the JEDEC
member testimony.49

B. Did the Duty Apply to PendingApplications?
The CAFC based its decision regarding the duty to disclose solely on the
testimony of the JEDEC members, but failed to fully consider that same source when
determining what information members are required to disclose; specifically,
whether Rambus needed to disclose pending patents it undoubtedly believed would
be encompassed in the forthcoming standard. According to the appellate division, the
from now, Rambus could be collecting royalties from virtually every player in the entire memory
market. Id. Further illustrating the Rambus windfall is the history of its stock value: shares of
Rambus have surged - Rambus stock was trading at $113.75 at midday on the day of the court
decision, up $16.63, or more than 17 percent. Id.The shares had traded below $38.00 prior to the
reversal by the CAFC. Id. The decision will inevitably lead to a price increase of memory and in
turn the customer will be forced absorb the effects, as the industry operates on low margins and the
manufacturers will not be able to absorb the impact. Tom Mainelli, Memory Malaise: Rambus
Lawsuits Could Raise RAM Prices, PC World, available at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/
0,aid,44747,00.asp (last visited June 14, 2003).
46Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1100.
47Id.at 1100.
48 Id.at 1097. The court interpreted the following excerpt from Appendix E: "Patented items or
processes: avoid requirements in the standards that call for use of a patented item or process. No
program standard shall refer to a patented item or process unless all of the technical information
covered by the patent is known to the formulating committee or working group ...."Id.
49 Id. at 1099. There is no duty at law for members to disclose anything to the JEDEC
committee - the court adopts the testimony of the members. This adoption of the member testimony
becomes crucial to this analysis in section II when the court fails to fully consider the members'
testimony.
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final standard did not fully encompass the Rambus technology and therefore no duty
to disclose existed.50 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Prost points out that the court
has gone so far as to apply the de novo standard in its decision.5' In creating this
rule, the appellate court used a reactive approach of hindsight rather than promoting
good faith business practice as applied to SSO's. Ultimately, the majority holds that
the ends do justify the means: "a member's subjective beliefs, hopes, and desires are
irrelevant.., hence, Rambus' mistaken belief that it had pending claims covering the
standard does not substitute for proof required."5 2 In fact, it appears the majority
failed to consider the JEDEC members' interpretation of its policy, that is, whether
the policy contains a good faith requirement regarding disclosure of pending patents.
While testifying at trial, the former chairman of JEDEC stated that if a member
attended a meeting and then subsequently wrote claims based upon knowledge
gleaned at the meeting, a "complete violation of JEDEC requirements of openness
and fairness with regard to notification" would occur.53 The fact that the parties
found a need to hide information regarding a patent or patent application, suggests
that disclosure would have influenced the direction of the standard development.54
50 Id. at 1117. The dissent points out that the district court in its opinion identifies six
instances where Rambus had pending claims related to the SDRAM standard, what is illustrative of
Rambus' belief that the standard did encompass its technology. Id.
51 Id. See also Gifis' Law Dictionary 137 (4th ed. 1996) (defining a de novo hearing as a hearing
in which the appeals court suspends the trial court's judgment and decides the case as if no prior
trial had been held).
[T]he majority accepts the argument [by Rambus] that none of these pending
claims actually reads on the SDRAM standard . . . [T]he majority has gone so far
as to make a de novo comparison of the pending claims to the JEDEC standard in
order to conclude that no claims could possibly read on the standard ... [W]e as a
court of review are not in such a position to make such a finding.
Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1117. The dissent insinuates that the CAFC was not in a position to make this
determination based on the evidence that the parties presented. Id.
52 Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1105 (reasoning that because "there is no expectation that the
undisclosed claims are necessary to implement the standard, these clams did not trigger Rambus'
disclosure duty" in light of the pending cases for infringement at the time of appeal).
5 Id. at 1099. Testimony was given at trial by Gordon Kelley, IBM's JEDEC representative
and committee chairman during some period of Rambus' tenure with the committee. Gordon also
testified that "[i]f [a JEDEC member] exercised the design or production of the component that was
being standardized [it] would require the use of that patent ... in other words, in order to practice a
standard, it would be necessary to use the feature that was patented." Id. Testimony of Reese
Brown, a consultant to JEDEC charged with editing standards, stated that "[w]henever material
comes up in the committee for discussion and for voting, any members who are aware of any patent
position or potential patent positions on the material should and are obligated to reveal that to the
committee at that time." Td. at 1113. John Kelly, general counsel to EIA/JEDEC, testified that policy
requires "the early disclosure of patents and patent applications that are or may be required to
comply with the standard." Td. at 1114. Furthermore, "[a]nother requirement was that they [patent
holders] would agree that their licensing practice to all other member companies of JEDEC would be
that all companies would be licensed, excepting none, and that the license would be either free or
offered at reasonable rates, without exception." Id. at 1113.
54 Maurits Dolmans, Standa-rds For Standards,26 FORDHAVi INT'L L.J. 163, 184 (2002). If a
firm conspires to conceal the existence of information from other members of a standards setting
organization, it constitutes a per se violation of any group policy whose object is the restriction of
competition within its ranks. Td. Dolmans discusses the intersection of intellectual property and
standards setting organizations in the European markets, and concludes that virtually identical
problems exists with patent disclosure policies. Id. at 189.
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The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit also concludes that "[n]o reasonable
jury could find otherwise.
In drawing this conclusion, the court failed to fully
consider the JEDEC policy and the trial court record which included member
testimony. The lower court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Rambus'
motion for a JMOL on the fraud count, nor when it allowed the jury verdict.56 In fact,
the district court found the evidence so clear that it deemed extraordinary
circumstances and awarded Infineon attorney's fees, an act that generally indicates a
party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously and that "the very temple of justice has been
defiled. 57

C.DidRambus Commit FraudAgainstJEDEGMembers?
Significant evidence was presented at trial which led the jury to find that
Rambus intended to defraud JEDEC members.5 8 Evidence showed that Rambus was
manipulating its patent applications to fit the forthcoming standards. Most
convincing is Rambus' June 1992 business plan that detailed the intent to use
pending patents against anyone using the SDRAM standard.5 9 Rambus believed they
had destroyed all documentation evidencing their plan to patent the SDRAM

55Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1105. The court reasoned that substantial evidence does not support
the jury verdict that Rambus breached its duty and accordingly overturned the finding. Td.
56 Id. at 1118. Dissenting Judge Prost views the evidence before the jury to be "more than
sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have concluded that Rambus had a duty to disclose
pending and issued patents that might be involved in JEDEC's development of the SDRAM
standard and that Rambus violated that duty." Further, Judge Prost recognizes the efforts of the
majority to create a bright line rule as to what will constitute fraud in the context of a standards
setting organization, but she contends that such a rule fails. Id. She predicts that as a result, an
action for fraud will become a federal patent case, which should be handled under state law. Id.
57 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991); Rambus, 318 F.3d at 23. Rambus was
advised by its attorneys that it should stop attending JEDEC and that if Rambus continued to
attend JEDEC meetings and remained silent, Rambus would risk making some patents
unenforceable by allowing the standard to go forward and failing to disclose that they have patents.
Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1108. A Rambus employee yestified that "[Rambus] did not tell the people at
JEDEC that what they were proposing for standardization infringed [its] patents," and "we
[Rambus] may not want to make it easy for all to figure out what we have ...... d.at 23. In
response to direct questioning from JEDEC on Rambus' intellectual property position as it relates to
the standard, Rambus replied "[a]t this time Rambus elects to not make a specific comment on our
intellectual property position .....
"Td. Finally, Rambus instituted a document "retention" policy for
the purpose of "getting rid of any documents that might be harmful in litigation." Id. at 1108-09.
58 Id. at 1109. The elements required under Virginia law for the tort doctrine of fraud as: 1) a
false representation of material fact, 2) made intentionally and knowingly, 3) with intent to mislead,
4) reliance by the party misled and 5) resulting in damage. Id.
,9Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1107. The Rambus June 18, 1992 business plan states that:
We believe that Sync DRAMs infringe on some claims in our filed patents; and
that there are additional claims we can file for our patents that cover features of
Sync DRAMs. Then we will be in position to request patent licensing from any
manufacturer .... Our action plan is to determine the exact claim and file the
additional claims by the end of Q3/92.
Id. This plan presents a clear intent, in writing, that Rambus had the mens rea (guilty mind) to
commit fraud. Id.
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standard and in turn proceeded to provide false and misleading testimony at trial.60
Subsequently, the court obtained many of the documents Rambus sought to conceal
which led to Rambus admitting in open court that they had in fact participated in the
prosecution of patent applications based on information learned at JEDEC
meetings. 61 Yet the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit claims insufficient
evidence before it and relies on the virtual loop hole that the SDRAM standard
eventually failed to fully encompass patents held by Rambus.
Rambus' culpability is further illustrated by the subsequent Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) complaint which is still pending.6 2 In the complaint, the FTC
alleges that Rambus acted with anticompetitive intent for over a decade by illegally
monopolizing and attempting to manipulate industry standards set by JEDEC,
resulting in adverse effects on competition and consumers everywhere. 63 The
complaint focuses on Rambus' intentional destruction of documentation in order to
conceal fraudulent acts and mitigate liability during impending litigation.64 The
6o Id. at 1109. Having believed that they had destroyed or disguised the documents evidencing
their plan, Rambus' executives, committed perjury in court and during depositions. Id. Multiple
executives of Rambus, including Chief Executive Officer, Geoff Tate, testified that there was no
attempt to obtain patents covered by the standard. iambus, 155 F.Supp at 683. Subsequently,
when confronted with documentation in court, Tate recanted his testimony, claiming, as did another
corporate executive, that he had a memory lapse during his first statement). Id.
61 Id. at 1107.
62 In re Rambus, Inc., at http://www.ftc.gov/ox/2002/06/rambuscmp.htm (last visited March 26,

2003). The FTC has accused Rambus of three distinct violations of willfully engaging in a pattern of
anticompetitive and exclusionary acts and practices. These include: 1) obtaining monopoly power in
the SDRAM technology market and narrower markets - through acts which constitute unfair
methods in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 2) performing the mentioned violation with specific
intent to monopolize, which has at minimum resulted in a dangerous probability of monopolization
and 3) unreasonably restraining trade in the SDRAM market. Id., see also 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2003)
(stating that "unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful").
63 See Federal Trade Commission, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/06/rambuscmp.htm
(last
visited June 14, 2003), concluding that:
[t]he pattern of anticompetitive conduct by Rambus that is at issue in this action
has materially caused or threatened to cause substantial harm to competition,
and will in the future materially cause or threaten to cause further substantial
injury to competition and to consumers, absent the issuance of appropriate relief
in the manner set forth .... calling for Rambus to be enjoined from: enforcing any
patent rights pursuant to the JEDEC standards, undertaking any new efforts
involving JEDEC standards, SDRAM, DDR-RAM and requiring that Rambus
employ a FTC officer responsible for communicating Rambus' patent rights
related to any future SSO activity.
Id. Further, the FTC claim indicates that Rambus has contacted chip manufacturers world wide in
order to collect licenses at an increased rate of 3.5 percent, which is at least one percent over
Rambus' usual rate. Id. Also, Rambus has threatened that it will demand even higher royalties
from any manufacturer that refuses to license the technology and instead chooses to litigate. Id.
61 Id. (charging Rambus with "engaging in a systematic effort - blessed if not orchestrated by
its most senior executives - to destroy documents and other information ... wholly or in substantial
part with the purpose of avoiding or minimizing the adverse legal repercussions of the
anticompetitive conduct set forth"). The claim also seeks to reverse the effects of the anticompetitive
conduct which include: 1) increased prices associated with the manufacture, sale and use of SDRAM
technology, 2) increase in the price and/or reductions in the use or output, of SDRAM chips and the
products which use them, 3) decreased incentive on the part of manufacturers to produce products
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Federal Circuit decision may have a stifling impact on the FTC claim as it gives
Rambus a ledge to stand on in refuting the fraud allegations. 65 Rambus' attorneys
will likely rely on the majority opinion which exonerates the company of all charges
against it in their defense against the FTC.
Also, in response to the ruling, the Boston based law firm of Lucash, Gesmer &
Updegrove LLP filed an amicus brief on behalf of six major SSO's. 66 The firm
believes that the Federal Circuit erred to the extent that it provided representation
for the SSO's on a pro bono basis. 67 The law firm intended the brief to educate the
U.S. District Court of Appeals on the potential influence this landmark case could
have on the standards setting process.68 In the brief, the firm requested that the
court grant a hearing en banc to permit the court to consider in full the negative
ramifications of its decision. 69 Among other consequences discussed, the brief stated
that by failing to punish Rambus the court places the integrity of every SSO in doubt
that include SDRAM technology, 4) decreased incentives on industry players to participate in
JEDEC or other SSO activities, and 5) both within and outside the industry, a decreased reliance, or
willingness to rely on standards established by SSO collaborations. Id.
65 Peter Kaplan, Court Throws Out Infineon Claim Against Rambus, CNET, News at
http://news.cnet.com/investor/news/newsitem/0-9900-1028-20827672-O.html
(last visited June 14,
2003) (agreeing that the appellate court decision provides authority that will help Rambus in all
pending suits especially the FTC lawsuit); Federal Circuit Rules in Rambus v. Infineon, at
http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2003/20030129.asp (last visited June 14, 2003) (providing
an opposing view, asserting that the decision will have little effect on the FTC claim against
Rambus even though it stems from the same set of facts because the CAFC's decision was based
upon the Virginia law of fraud, which requires the clear and convincing evidence standard, whereas
the FTC allegations of violations of federal antitrust law require it to meet the preponderance of the
evidence standard).
66 Boston law firm and technology groups team up to fight landmark decision that could
undermine hundreds of tech standards, at http://www.consortiuminfo.org/pressrelease/
rambus.shtml (last visited June 14, 2003) (boasting that the organizations behind the brief, six
participating SDOs including IMS Global Learning Consortium, Incorporated, OpenGIS
Consortium, PCI Industrial Computer Manufacturers Group, and The Open Group are comprised of
more than 850 members, including the vast majority of the most prominent technology companies
around
the globe);
NPRA
to File Amicus Brief in
California Waiver Case, at
http://www.npradc.org/news/releases/detail.cfm?docid=56&archive=1 (last visited June 14, 2003)
(defining an amicus brief as an instrument "filed by a nonparty to a suit who may be allowed to
introduce argument or evidence in case in support of its interests or to further the cause of justice");
see also Lucash, Gesmer & Updegrove, at: http://www.lgu.com/mainpage.htm/ (last visited June 14,
2003) (describing Lucash, Gesmer & Undergrove as a Boston-based law firm that specializes in
representing technology clients.
Its clients are individual entrepreneurs, private and public
companies, venture capitalists and major educational non-profit institutions).
67 Boston law Arm, supra note 66, (stating that the issue is so paramount that the firm was
able to assemble the group in less than a week). "We thought that the issues at hand were
important enough that we decided to do this work on a pro bono basis. This made it much easier to
pull such a comprehensive group together in a short time frame." Id.
68 Boston ]aw firm, supra note 66.
Due to the many standard setting clients which we represent, we thought that it
was important for the Court to better understand the consequences of its decision.
Moreover, the narrow analysis that the court applied in reviewing the
infringement claims leads some to fear that participating in standard setting will
now be more uncertain and difficult.
Id.
d9 See Gifis' Law Dictionary 167 (4th ed. 1996) (defining 'en Bane' as a decision "by the full
court" in appellate court jurisdictions where there is more than one judge panel).

[3:138 2003]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

by making participation more laborious, less effective, and less attractive. 7 Further,
the brief concluded that the court "should not permit the standards setting process to
be undermined by creating judicial rules that allow participants in voluntary
standard settings to avoid compliance with the intellectual property policies of the
bodies they have chosen to join.' Unfortunately, the brief was less than persuasive
to the members of the court who denied the motion for a hearing en bane, on April 4,
2003.72 However, the brief may serve another important purpose, that is to place the
United States Supreme Court on notice as to the far-reaching effects of the case.

D. Did the Court Ignore PublicPolicy?
During its deliberations the court failed to consider important public policy
ramifications. These policy considerations formed the basis of a frequently relied
upon case, In The Matter Of Dell Computer, where the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) filed a complaint against computer manufacturer Dell Corporation. 73 Dell
shares several important similarities with Rambus, in that it is a major player in the
computing industry and the FTC complaint centers on its actions while a member of
an SSO, the Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA).74 During its tenure,
Dell aided in the development of a VL-bus standard formulated to meet the needs of
new video intensive software. 75 Like Rambus, a Dell representative certified in
writing that the proposed standard did not infringe upon any pending patents or
patents that Dell possessed.76 Subsequent to the standard publication, Dell sought
license fees from several members of VESA who had adopted the standard, claiming
patent infringement.7 7 Dell was enjoined from collecting further license fees on its
patent for misleading other members 7of the SSO through less than good faith efforts
and violation of VESA's patent policy.

70 Boston law firm, supra note 66. That the court's decision will: undermine members
confidence that the voluntary standards setting process will lead to open standards that are not
subject to oppressive intellectual property restrictions, unnecessarily stress the entire standards
setting process, tilt the scales sharply in the favor of patent holders against the rights of the SSO to
adopt the policy of its choosing and suggest that even deliberate and egregious violations of an
understood intellectual property policy may not be remedied by the courts. Id.

71 Id.
72 Rambus

Inc. v. Infineon Tech., 318 F.3d 1081, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

73 Inro Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996), WL 121 F.T.C. 616.
74 See VESA, Our Mission, available at,http ./www vesa.orgimission.htm,(last visited June 14,

2003) (setting similar goals to JEDEC, specifically, "[to promote and develop timely, relevant, open
display and display interface standards, ensuring interoperability, and encouraging innovation and
market growth").
75 In re Dell, 121 F.T.C. at 617 (explaining that the VL-bus is responsible for carrying
information between a computer's central processing unit and its peripheral devices such as the
hard disc, monitor and modem).
76 Id.
(certifying his understanding that any party who engages in intentional misleading
conduct in the standards process may be estopped from asserting a patent, and that to the best of
his knowledge the proposed standard did not infringe upon any trademarks, copyrights, or patents
that Dell Corporation possessed).
77 Id.
78 Id.

at 620.
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In Dell, the FTC describes several negative effects that it was trying to correct
based on public policy considerations, effects that are certain to follow the Rambus
decision.7 9 First, the FTC stated that systems using the VL-bus standard will be
avoided due to concerns that the patent issues will affect the standard's success. °
While it may be too soon to determine the direct effect from Rambus, the result is
highly probable and has been predicted by industry analysts.8' As previously noted,
many industry players have already refused to pay the substantial license fees that
Rambus is seeking and some or all of these companies will be reluctant to use the
JEDEC standards in question. The decision will potentially have a nullifying effect
on future use of these standards by new market entrants as they may be reluctant to
83
navigate the beehive that the court has created.
Second, the Del] complaint states that as a result of the lack of good faith by
84
Dell, willingness to participate in industry standard-setting efforts had been chilled.
Like Dell, the Rambus decision cuts to the heart of the ideology behind SSO's like
VESA and JEDEC: "competitors who normally do not communicate get to talk about
important industry trends . . . and thereby save money."85 This will not occur if

participation results in a shell-game ending in costly litigation. In an interview with
Forbes, semiconductor industry analyst Matthew Godfrey was quoted stating that
the Rambus appellate decision will effect the entire memory industry - it will effect
them all.86
Finally, Dell states that such activities, which constitute unfair competition, are
to the prejudice and injury of the public.87 The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has focused on a virtual loophole rather than the reasoning set forth by the
trial court and has failed to consider the policy effects and subsequent injury to the

7)Id. (stating that through its lack of good faith efforts by engaging in the acts which
restrained competition Dell has injured the public in general, and that these acts constitute unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce in violation of FTC regulations).
80

Jd

81Fried, supra note 45, at 2, (stating that the industry has been affected at every juncture).
82 Id. (providing that industry leaders such as Toshiba, Hyundai, Micron and Hitachi have
previously refused to pay Rambus license fees, but have now started discussions in light of the
Appellate Decision).
8:3See supra note 7.
8
4InreDel], 121 F.T.C. at 618.
85See Joint Electronic Device Engineering Council, at http://www.jedec.org/joinjedec/who.cfm
(last visited June 14, 2003). Both large and small companies in these areas as well as users bring a
mix of views representing a wide facet of this industry. The reason to become a member is to find out
what the trends in a particular product area are and to find out the views of other companies as well
as to mold and shape the final standards that JEDEC publishes. Id.
86 Arik Hesseldahl, Rambus Revived Forbes Online at http://www.forbes.com/2003/01/29/
cx ah 0129rmbs.html (last visited June 14, 2003) (describing the reversal by the CAFC as "the last
thing anyone expected" to happen and jesting that Rambus has even tried to change its image and
logo since the district court decision in an attempt to "change their message"). Id.
87In re Del, 121 F.T.C. at 626. By not adhering to the VESA affirmative disclosure policy
towards intellectual property rights, which requires that members will act in good faith to identify
and disclose conflicting intellectual property rights, Dell, has '[i]nhibited the important role of
standard setting in the technological innovation that will drive much of this nation's competitive
vigor in the 21 t century." Id.
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public which will harm the technological plug-n-play society we live in on a grand
scale.88

III. PROPOSAL
The aftermath of the appellate decision in Rambus will create a vortex at the
intersection of intellectual property and technology that could potentially swallow
standards setting, removing the backbone of our plug-n-play society.89 In
consideration of the effects subsequent to Dell Corporation's nondisclosure in Dell
and the predictions of industry analysts as to the momentum of Rambus, this
comment proposes two proactive responses and one reactive measure in order to
alleviate the negative effects caused by the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.90
A.

The UnitedStates Supreme CourtShould Grant Certiorari

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied the motion for a rehearing
en banc which was sought in the amicus brief prepared by the firm Lucash, Gesmer
& Updegrove. 9' However, the amicus brief should serve to place the United States
Supreme Court on notice as to the possible far reaching detrimental effects that the
reversal by the Federal Circuit may have. 92 In the Court's determination of whether
to grant certiorari, the Court should consider the scope of the amici that initiated the
motion. The striking number of companies represented through the brief and the
untold number of markets involved defines the magnitude of the case, which goes
beyond the Rambus - Infineon feud.
The Supreme Court should view the
circumstances with a broad focus and should not apply the narrow rule which the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit promulgated. 93 Also, the Court should have
vision beyond the factors that the lower court considered, specifically, that the
JEDEC Intellectual Property Rights Policy did not set forth a legal obligation for its
88 Mainelli, supra note 45, at 2 (suggesting that since Rambus has won on appeal and will
likely seek licenses on much of the $29 billion RAM market, the result will be an increase in RAM
chip prices to be absorbed by the end user).
89 If the standards setting process is extinguished from technological advancement, the rapid
progression that we currently enjoy will clearly be removed.
90 In re Dell, 121 F.T.C. at 626; see also Hesseldahl, supra note 86 (describing the far reaching
effects of the appellate court reversal as causing night sweats and unrest to every executive in the
memory chip manufacturing business).
91Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Tech., 318 F.3d 1081, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
92 In re Del], 121 F.T.C. at 616.
The effects that occurred as a result of the lack of good faith
effort by Dell Corporation by not disclosing a patent are: 1) industry acceptance of standards set by
the SSO's will be hindered primarily because computer manufacturers will be forced to delay their
use of the standard until the issues are resolved, 2) systems using the standards will be avoided due
to concerns that acceptance of the standard will be prevented, 3) this uncertainty will drive the price
of implementation up as well as the costs of developing competing designs and, 4) willingness to
participate in standards setting efforts will be chilled. Id.
9 Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1105 (describing the reactive approach that the CAFC took when it
used the fact that all of Rambus' patents did not fall under the umbrella of the standards as the
fulcrum of its decision).
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members to disclose pending patents and the hindsight rule that Rambus patent
applications failed to fully mature into patents covered under the standards.9 4
The Court should consider the similarities between Rambus and Dell,
particularly the policy considerations that were the basis of the FTC complaint in
Dell. These effects cannot be ignored; if the appellate court's decision to reverse is
left untouched, like Dell,it follows that manufacturers in every industry will hesitate
if not cease to participate in standard setting efforts. 95 As previously noted, this
ripple effect is already present and the full impact follows. 96 Further, this result will
stifle technological compatibility and advancement - potentially on a global scale.
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court should grant certiorari and reinstate
the district court decision or choose to apply a remedy of its election. 97
B. Rambus IncorporatedShould Provide Royalty Free Licenses on The
Technology CoveredBy JEDECStandards
In a similar situation that Rambus should consider, IBM agreed to offer licenses
on a royalty free basis for a late disclosed patent on the Electronic Business XML web
standard. 9 IBM's decision was calculated to serve as a good faith measure and to
strengthen its reputation of integrity in the market place. 99 While this move would
effectively cancel millions of dollars spent on attorneys' fees and nullify the court
decision, it may prove beneficial to all parties involved. This act could serve to
strengthen Rambus' position that it did not defraud the JEDEC members.' 0 Having
the court decision on its side, Rambus now has proof which exonerates it from legal
91Id. at 1112.
9 In re Dell, 121 F.T.C. at 616.
96Fried, supra note 45.
97See Mueller, supra note 3 at 655-62. Mueller analyzes other remedies available to the court
when a patent holder misuses the standards setting process.
Remedies such as equitable
estoppel/implied license, which operates to "prohibit a patent owner from recovering for
infringement if the owner fails to disclose the existence of its proprietary rights to a standardssetting organization." Id. Also available, but generally used in cases involving public health or
military need, is the doctrine of eminent domain. Id. at 658. Eminent domain is defined as: the
power of a governmental entity (federal or other agencies) to take private property for public use,
with or without the permission of the owner. Gifts' Law Dictionary 166 (4th ed. 1996). According to
Mueller, eminent domain is reserved for extreme circumstances, where public health or safety may
be compromised (see Smith Kline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharm., Inc. 211
F.3d 21, 661 (2d Cir. 2000)). Mueller, supra note 3 at 661. The court should consider application of
eminent domain to the Rambus patents, finding the possible effects to technology similar to public
health policy. Id. See Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
98 Dolmans, supra note 54, at 186. IBM understands the policy behind SSO's and the
ramifications to profitability for unethical business practice. Td. "[N]o liability can exist if a firm
acted in good faith and, upon late disclosure, decided to take the high road and license the patent
royalty free." Id.
99 Karl F. Best, IP Statement from IB,
at http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/ebxmlcppa/200205/msgOO047.html (last visited April 15, 2003) (explaining that "[g]iven IBM's clear
statements about the importance of OASIS in the global standardization process. IBM wanted to
remove any potential confusion regarding implementation of the specification . . .IBM wanted to
provide the assurance that our [patent] portfolio would not impede adoption of the specifications.").
Id.
100Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1090.
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claims. In furtherance of Rambus' mission statement to "[d]o the right thing and
conduct business ethically and with integrity," they should assert that they have
done no wrong legally, but admit to a lack of ethics and integrity.'
In furtherance of
this good faith effort, licenses should be granted on a royalty free basis or at least at
a discounted rate.
C StandardsSetting OrganizationsMust Adopt ClearIntellectualProperty
Rights Policies
The trial testimony which was ignored by the Federal Circuit in Ramb us,
presented key JEDEC members statements that interpreted its intellectual property
rights policy as creating an affirmative duty in members to disclose pending patent
applications. The conflict in views between how JEDEC members interpret the
policy versus how one member, Rambus Inc. and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit interpret the policy, illustrates the need for clear policy language. As
indicated earlier, 67 percent of a random sample group of SSO's have disclosure
policies.'0 2 While this majority showing is encouraging, the first step to creating any
new SSO, and an interim step by any current SSO prior to promulgating new
standards is to adopt intellectual property policies which have concise language
clearly understandable by all, with affirmative language creating a duty to disclose.
D. StandardSetting OrganizationsShould Merge Efforts With
Larger Organizations
Industry members are best suited to formulate standards that effect trends
in their perspective arenas, however, the administrative efforts behind SSO's should
be left to parent organizations. Groups such as The American National Standards
Institute (ANSI), which has a multi-tiered organizational hierarchy are structured to
help manage the administrative needs for members, thus leaving only the standards
setting process to the SSO's. 3 ANSI has among other subcommittees, a separate
general policy committee, patent group, and conformity assessment policy
committee. 0 4
Each of these divisions are comprised of volunteer corporate
representatives from the various SSO's as well as full time staff administrators to
help promote neutrality and fairness to its members.' 5 Most of these organizations
101See Rambus website, at http://www.rambus.com/about/mission.cfm (last visited June 14,
2003) (stating that its core value is to "take risks and learn from mistakes" as well as to act with
integrity and make commitments to drive results and honor them.
102 Lemley, supra note 33.
1:3
See American National Standards Institute, Standards Activity Overview, at
http://www.ansi.org/standards-activities/overview/overview.aspx?menuid=3
(last visited June 14,
2003) (explaining that ANSI strives to protect participants through '[t]he ANSI process serves all
standardization efforts in the United States by providing and promoting a process that withstands
scrutiny, while protecting the rights and interests of every participant.").
104 See American
National Standards Institute, Structure and Management, at
http://www.ansi.org/about-ansi/organization-chart/chart.aspx?menuid=l
(last visited June 14,
2003).
105 I-d. While JEDEC clearly had neutrality and fairness as one of its priorities, it leaves the
compliance to this priority to the several subcommittees, whereas ANSI is structured to provide a
checks and balance system in furtherance of the priority.
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are comprised of SSO's from within the same industry, further adding to the
cohesiveness of industry competitors in this neutral environment. The benefits of
belonging to such organizations are clear and groups such as JEDEC
should consider
0 6
membership as a next step in preventing another Rambus disaster.1

IV. CONCLUSION
Failing to disclose a patent or patent application held by a member of a standard
setting organization that will or may be encompassed in a forthcoming standard is
nothing short of fraud. Intent to commit fraud combined with a violation of an SSO's
intellectual property rights policy which creates an affirmative duty in members to
disclose such a patent or application is a violation of public policy and business ethics
that should not be condoned at any level of adjudication.0 7 Further, in a perverse
instance when an SSO member uses inside information to manipulate patent
applications during an ongoing process, the sanction should be equated to include the
maximum punitive measures permitted by law, including an award of attorney's fees.
Failure to recognize such considerations would have a cause and effect in the
standards setting community stifling these efforts in whole.
By violating these rules, Rambus has clearly taken advantage of the JEDEC
standards committee, its members and end users world-wide through its actions
during and after its tenure with committee JC-42.3. 0 8 The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit failed in not affirming the district court decision, and as a result, the
court has been victimized by the Rambus shell game.
SSO's must consider Rambus' acts when adopting patent disclosure policies to
ensure that the language selected clearly sets forth a duty to disclose. Finally, the
United States Supreme Court must reinstate the decision of the district court and
hold Rambus liable for its actions.

106 Joe Brockmier, Why Rambus Should Lose, at http://www.osopinion.com/perl/story/
21033.html (last visited, June 14, 2003) (explaining "if Rambus wins the final round, you can be sure
other companies will be in for nasty surprises.").

107 Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and Intellectual Property, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1043, 1082 (2002) (stating that by [the court] taking the power of the
standards setting organizations to negotiate and interpret on behalf of its members, removes the
equilibrium between the patent system and SSO's).
108 Id. at 1052.

